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Confessions of a Disease Monger
James Phelps
I am a disease monger. I teach primary care doctors how 
to identify bipolar disorder. Worse yet, I take money from 
pharmaceutical companies for doing so. I use it to subsidize my 
practice so that I can treat patients with no insurance, or little 
money, who now account for over a third of my patients—in 
part because the pharmaceutical companies have drained so 
much money out of the health-care system. Ironic, isn’t it?
My Web site PsychEducation.org (http:⁄⁄www.
psycheducation.org) is number one on Google for searches 
on “bipolar II.” See if you think it looks like disease 
mongering. Hundreds of people have written thanking 
me for explaining bipolar II and the concept of a bipolar 
spectrum, indicating that this new perspective really helps 
them understand their long-standing symptoms. To my 
immediate recall, none have complained about being led 
astray by an overbroad interpretation of bipolarity. 
Notice that, just like Mr. Moynihan, one of the guest editors 
of your April 2006 series of articles on disease mongering [1], 
I could be mongering even now, as I too have a new book. 
At least I’m not trying to attract attendees to my conference. 
Tricky, isn’t it. Has there been an oversimpliﬁ  cation in this 
analysis?
(PsychEducation.org earned an Honorable Mention Mofﬁ  c 
Award for Ethical Practice in Community Psychiatry, 2005.)  
James Phelps (E-mail: jimp@psycheducation.org)
Co-Psych.com, PsychEducation.org
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Fairness Creams in South Asia—
A Case of Disease Mongering?
P. Ravi Shankar, Bishnu Rath Giri, Subish Palaian
We read with interest the article by Moynihan and Henry 
on disease mongering [1]. The authors argued that disease 
mongering is the opportunistic exploitation of a widespread 
anxiety about frailty and of faith in scientiﬁ  c advance and 
“innovation.” 
In South Asia there is a widespread preference for “fair 
skin” and this has been exploited by the manufacturers of 
“fairness creams.” “White” skin has a colonial connotation 
of power and superiority. The emergence of a “paler” global 
entertainment industry has served as a ﬁ  llip to the marketing 
of an international beauty ideal [2]. Beauty pageant winners 
in India are all extraordinarily tall and breathtakingly slim, 
have light honey-colored skin, and peddle Western ideals 
of beauty [3]. South Asian culture has carried within itself a 
capacity for female objectiﬁ  cation. Matrimonial columns and 
Web sites reveal the inﬂ  uence of a young woman’s skin color 
on her marketability to marriage partners [3]. 
The craze for modern fairness creams has emerged in 
the last ﬁ  fty years [2]. International cosmetics giants were 
the initial manufacturers, but these days Indian and South 
Asian companies are playing an important role in the skin 
bleaching and cosmetic markets [2,3]. Fairness creams have 
been estimated to account for up to 40% of the proﬁ  ts of the 
cosmetics industry [3]. Recently, a fairness cream has been 
launched exclusively for men [4]. 
Advertisements aim to produce a hierarchy of values based 
on the notion that “fairness” is an object of desire [2]. Being 
fair has been represented as an active process. Regular use of 
fairness creams has been claimed to halt the production of 
melanin and to bring out “natural” beauty.
Promoting a particular body image or behavior pattern as 
the preferred one and then selling medicines or products 
to help people attain the particular ideal may be regarded 
as disease mongering [5]. Fairness cream manufacturers 
have exploited the preference for fair skin, portrayed it as a 
necessary prerequisite for success, and promoted the use of 
their product to achieve the ideal. Controlled studies on the 
efﬁ  cacy and safety of fairness creams are lacking. 
Disease mongering companies form alliances with doctors, 
consumer groups, and the media to promote sales of their 
drugs. Fairness cream manufacturers sponsor beauty pageants 
and carry out an advertising blitz in the print and audiovisual 
media [3]. They create hype about their product. Many 
leading manufacturers have expanded their range to include 
lotions, cold creams, and soaps.
Most fairness creams are nonprescription products, 
and the medical profession may not be the main target of 
marketing professionals. However, doctors as responsible 
and respected members of society have an important role 
to play in spreading awareness about this racial distortion of 
body image. Fairness creams may satisfy many of the criteria 
of disease mongering. The issues of freedom of choice, 
economic impact (personal and on the society), proﬁ  ts, social 
issues, and ideal body image should be seriously debated.  
P. Ravi Shankar (E-mail: pathiyilravi@gmail.com)
Bishnu Rath Giri
Subish Palaian
Manipal College of Medical Sciences
Pokhara, Nepal
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Disease Mongering: One of the Hidden 
Consequences
Kenneth Gillman
I found Moynihan and Henry’s article on disease mongering 
[1] interesting, especially because I have previously suggested 
that the medical profession might consider being more 
proactive concerning various problematic areas in their 
interactions with the pharmaceutical industry by exercising 
their considerable power and improving the scientiﬁ  c quality 
of research [2]. There is a strong tendency for doctors 
to be trusting and accepting of the good intentions and 
honesty of others. It takes a substantial amount of evidence 
for doctors to adopt the contrary posture of distrust. 
Perhaps the profession is, understandably, at that point with 
pharmaceutical companies.
A signiﬁ  cant hidden area related to disease mongering is 
the inevitable increase in doctors’ medico-legal insurance 
costs. The pharmaceutical industry has generally been 
quite successful in getting doctors to shoulder the blame 
for the negative consequences of drug treatment. They 
are quick to inform the profession (and patients, by covert 
direct-to-consumer advertising) of any evidence favourable 
to the promotion of their drug, but slow to update the 
product information, or inform doctors, about side effects, 
complications, or drug interactions [3]. It is dishonest 
to actively promote supposed advantages (to patients) 
whilst consciously failing to look for, or alert doctors to, 
the disadvantages. Furthermore, inducing patients to visit 
doctors and pressure them into colluding with drug company 
advertising is a subtle form of bullying.
Medical insurers tend to accept full responsibility on 
behalf of doctors without much attempt to bring others 
into legal actions, especially drug companies. Since both 
patients and doctors are being fed misinformation, it may 
be that a greater part of the responsibility for difﬁ  culties 
should be apportioned to drug companies. Perhaps both 
doctors and drug companies need to be reminded that only 
doctors are able to sign prescriptions and take the primary 
responsibility for the consequences. It may be time for 
medical organizations and authorities to impose conditions 
and demand more information from pharmaceutical 
companies if they are going to agree to sign the script. As but 
one of many possible examples, how many doctors realise that 
drug toxicity data are rarely made available and that much of 
the data presented to regulatory authorities are not available 
to ordinary doctors? I suggest that those in the profession 
who are in a position to inﬂ  uence such matters should give 
serious consideration to these and other similar questions 
and exercise their power.  
Kenneth Gillman (E-mail: kg@matilda.net.au)
Pioneer Valley Private Hospital
Mackay, Australia
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Deﬁ  ning Disease in the Information 
Age
Olavo B. Amaral
The series of disease mongering articles in the April 2006 
issue of PLoS Medicine overall seem to deﬁ  ne the term as 
“widening the boundaries of illness” [1] by “taking a normal 
function and implying that there’s something wrong with it 
and that it should be treated” [2]. While there is undoubtedly 
a strong case to be made for this sort of practice by 
pharmaceutical companies, perhaps we should also question 
ourselves on what we mean by “disease boundaries.”
All of the conditions touched on by the disease mongering 
series (e.g., bipolar disease, attention deﬁ  cit hyperactivity 
disorder, restless legs syndrome, and sexual dysfunctions) 
share the fact that they represent spectra of symptoms felt 
by virtually everyone, but which for some people can reach a 
point at which they become disturbing. However, since the 
beneﬁ  t of treating these symptoms is ultimately dependent 
on their signiﬁ  cance in a patient’s life, it seems doubtful 
that anyone but the patient can adequately deﬁ  ne the 
“boundaries” of illness for these conditions.
The existence of these large “grey zones” between disease 
and normality (as well as the difﬁ  culty of doctors in dealing 
with them) might help to explain the increase in “lifestyle 
drug use” and self-prescription of psychiatric medication [3]. 
While these behaviors undoubtedly carry risks, they might well 
be an inevitable development in an age where information on 
anything (including drugs) is so widely available. Moreover, 
tampering with body chemistry is nothing new (alcohol, coffee, 
chocolate, and sunlight come to mind as examples), and it is 
hard to expect people will not do it because of pharmaceutical 
labels. Therefore, complain as we may, it is unlikely that this 
trend can be feasibly prevented.
Therefore, if we want to prevent disease mongering, perhaps 
we should start by focusing on our own concept of “disease.” 
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Maybe it is time we start to loosen the grip on our powers to 
deﬁ  ne disease and start working less as diagnosing machines 
and more as decision facilitators for patients. It seems quite 
absurd to decide on a “concept” of erectile dysfunction or 
depression that can deﬁ  ne who should be treated. On the 
contrary, our role should be to inform patients of the beneﬁ  ts 
and risks of treatment (or nontreatment) for their particular 
condition. This also means being comfortable with the fact 
that, no matter which criteria one uses to deﬁ  ne disease, there 
will always be “normal” people who will want treatment as 
well as “sick” people who will refuse it. And in both cases they 
are probably entitled to do so, without necessarily receiving a 
diagnosis of “normal” or “sick.”
Moreover, since the trend for self-prescription is not likely 
to be prevented, and since the pharmaceutical industry will 
surely try to capitalize on it, perhaps we should also worry 
about making nonproﬁ  t, unbiased scientiﬁ  c information more 
available to the public. Education on health matters is an 
important responsibility that traditionally has been overlooked 
by doctors in most countries. Now, if ever, seems to be the time 
to change that, because if physicians do not concentrate on it, 
drug companies will be happy to do it for them.
It is obvious that medicine cannot abandon the concept 
of disease boundaries, since most of our medical knowledge 
and research is still based on it. Moreover, there are ﬁ  elds 
in which medical responsibility is sure to remain important 
in deﬁ  ning these boundaries (e.g., attribution of public 
funds, research studies, and treatment of children). But after 
reading so much on disease mongering, it seems to me that 
if we become a little more ﬂ  exible in admitting that “disease 
boundaries” for many conditions are an oxymoron, perhaps 
the pharmaceutical industry will make less of a fuss in trying 
to convince people they are ill. My guess is that this would do 
everybody a favor.  
Olavo B. Amaral (E-mail: olavoamaral@yahoo.com.br)
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Porto Alegre, Brazil
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There Is No Such Thing as a Psychiatric 
Disorder/Disease/Chemical Imbalance
Fred Baughman
In her recent PLoS Medicine article, Christine Phillips 
writes: “ADHD [attention deﬁ  cit hyperactivity disorder] 
joins dyslexia and glue ear as disorders that are considered 
signiﬁ  cant primarily because of their effects on educational 
performance” [1]. A “disorder” is “a disturbance of function, 
structure, or both,” and thus, the equivalent of an objective 
abnormality/disease [2]. In neurologically normal children, 
dyslexia cannot be proved to be a disorder/disease. “Glue 
ear,” however, is otitis media, an objective abnormality/
disease. Phillips continues: “In the case of ADHD, there has 
been a complex, often heated debate in the public domain 
about the verity of the illness,” but proceeds, without an 
answer, to consider “the roles of teachers as brokers for 
ADHD and its treatment.” 
In 1948, “neuropsychiatry” was divided into “neurology,” 
dealing with diseases, and “psychiatry,” dealing with emotions 
and behaviors [3]. If there is a macroscopic, microscopic, or 
chemical abnormality, a disease is present. Nowhere in the 
brains or bodies of children said to have ADHD or any other 
psychiatric diagnosis has a disorder/disease been conﬁ  rmed. 
Psychiatric drugs appeared in the ﬁ  fties. Psychiatry and the 
pharmaceutical industry authored the “chemical imbalance” 
market strategy: they would call all things psychological 
“chemical imbalances” needing “chemical balancers”—pills.
At the September 29, 1970, hearing on Federal 
Involvement in the Use of Behavior Modiﬁ  cation Drugs on 
Grammar School Children, Ronald Lipman of the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), argued: 
“hyperkinesis is a medical syndrome. It should be properly 
diagnosed by a medical doctor” [4].
In 1986, Nasrallah et al. [5] reported brain atrophy in adult 
males treated with amphetamines as children, concluding: 
“since all of the HK/MBD [hyperkinetic/minimal brain 
dysfunction] patients had been treated with psychostimulants, 
cortical atrophy may be a long-term adverse effect of this 
treatment.” 
At the 1998 National Institutes of Health (NIH) Consensus 
Development Conference on ADHD, Carey [6] stated: “The 
ADHD behaviors are assumed to be largely or entirely due 
to abnormal brain function. The DSM-IV does not say so but 
textbooks and journals do.... What is now most often described 
as ADHD...appears to be a set of normal behavioral variations.” 
However Swanson and Castellanos [7], having reviewed 
the structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) research, 
testiﬁ  ed: “Recent investigations provide converging evidence 
that a reﬁ  ned phenotype of ADHD/HKD (hyperkinetic 
disorder) is characterized by reduced size in speciﬁ  c 
neuroanatomical regions of the frontal lobes and basal 
ganglia.” I challenged Swanson, asking: “Why didn’t you 
mention that virtually all of the ADHD subjects were on 
stimulant therapy—the likely cause of their brain atrophy?” 
[8] Swanson confessed this was so—that there had been no 
such studies of ADHD-untreated cohorts.
The Consensus Conference Panel concluded: “We do not 
have a valid test for ADHD... there are no data to indicate that 
ADHD is a brain malfunction” [9]. (This wording appeared 
in the version of the ﬁ  nal statement of the Consensus 
Conference Panel distributed at the press conference in the 
ﬁ  nal part of the Consensus Conference, November 18, 1998. 
This wording, which appeared for an indeterminate time on 
the NIH Web site, was subsequently removed and replaced 
with wording claiming “validity” for ADHD.)
In 2002, Castellanos et al. [10] published the one and 
only MRI study of an ADHD-untreated group. However, 
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because the ADHD-untreated patients were two years younger 
than the controls, the study was invalid, leaving stimulant 
treatment, not the never-validated disorder, ADHD, the likely 
cause of the brain atrophy. 
In 2002, Daniel Weinberger, of the National Institute 
of Mental Health, claimed “major psychiatric diseases” 
are associated with “subtle but objectively characterizable 
changes” but could reference not a single proof (quoted in 
[11]). 
In 2002, the Advertisement Commission of Holland 
[12] determined that the claim that ADHD is an inborn 
brain dysfunction was misleading and enjoined the Brain 
Foundation of the Netherlands to cease such representations. 
In 2003, Ireland prohibited GlaxoSmithKline from 
claiming that the antidepressant Paxil “works by bringing 
serotonin levels back to normal.” Wayne Goodman of the 
FDA  acknowledged that claims that selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors correct a serotonin imbalance go “too 
far,” but had the temerity to suggest that “this is reasonable 
shorthand for expressing a chemically or brain-based 
problem” (quoted in [13]).
At an FDA hearing on March 23, 2006, I testiﬁ  ed: “Saying 
any psychiatric diagnosis ‘is a brain-based problem and 
that the medications are normalizing function’ is an anti-
scientiﬁ  c, pro-drug lie” [14]. Yet this has become standard 
practice throughout medicine, for example, at the American 
Psychiatric Association [15],  American Medical Association 
[16], American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
American Academy of Pediatrics, Child Neurology Society, 
American Academy of Family Physicians [17], FDA [13], and 
virtually all US government health-care agencies. 
Journal articles [6], press releases, ads [18], drug inserts, 
and research informed consent documents say, or infer, 
that psychological diagnoses are abnormalities/diseases. 
All patients and research participants with psychological 
problems are led to believe they have an abnormality/disease, 
biasing them in favor of medical interventions, and against 
nonmedical interventions (e.g., love,  will power, or talk 
therapy), which presume, as is the case, that the individual 
is physically and medically normal and without need of a 
medical/pharmaceutical intervention. 
The FDA is the agency most responsible for conveying the 
facts needed by the public to make risk versus beneﬁ  t and 
informed consent decisions. Instead—by protecting industry, 
not the public—the FDA is a purveyor of the psychiatric 
“disease” and “chemical imbalance” lie. This must change.  
Fred Baughman (E-mail: fredbaughmanmd@cox.net)
El Cajon, California, United States of America 
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The Newest Mania: Seeing Disease 
Mongering Everywhere
S. Nassir Ghaemi
I feel compelled to comment on your article on bipolar 
disorder by my friend and colleague David Healy [1]. I 
respect Dr. Healy both as a historian of psychopharmacology 
and psychiatry and as a psychopharmacology researcher. I 
have been impressed by his historical scholarship over the 
years in bringing out the economic and social aspects of the 
rise of psychopharmacology. I think his speciﬁ  c critiques 
about the likely overuse of antidepressants in the West in 
recent years, as well as the inﬂ  uence of the pharmaceutical 
industry, have been valid in many respects. I also ﬁ  nd the 
PLoS Medicine’s April 2006 series of articles on disease 
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mongering not unconvincing, especially as it relates to new 
potential diagnoses like adult attention deﬁ  cit hyperactivity 
disorder. Yet I must take exception to the inclusion of bipolar 
disorder with such newfangled entities. 
Mania and melancholia have been well described since 
antiquity, and the current notions about the diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder (even the broader notions of the “bipolar 
spectrum”) are fully present in the writings of Esquirol and 
Kraepelin. It seems highly unlikely that they were markedly 
inﬂ  uenced by the pharmaceutical industry. To accept the 
drift of this collection of articles, one would have to suppose 
that Arataeus of Cappadocia was heavily inﬂ  uenced by 
pharmaceutical marketing in the 1st century a.d. 
Of course, the possibility of overdiagnosis of bipolar 
disorder exists, often inﬂ  uenced by the pharmaceutical 
industry, but this in no way means that the diagnosis 
itself is invalid, nor does it counteract the much larger 
empirical evidence that bipolar disorder has been highly 
underdiagnosed (rather than the minimal empirical evidence 
that it is overdiagnosed) in the antidepressant era [2]. Dr. 
Healy seems to emphasize the issue in children, where indeed 
more uncertainty exists, but the overall impression of the 
article does not do justice to the reality that this illness has 
a long history of description and much more evidence of 
nosological validity (based on description, genetics, course, 
and biological data) [3] than such newcomers as adult 
attention deﬁ  cit hyperactivity disorder and restless legs 
syndrome. Perhaps we should be on the lookout for the 
newest mania: seeing disease mongering everywhere.  
S. Nassir Ghaemi (E-mail: nghaemi@emory.edu)
Emory University
Atlanta, Georgia, United States of America
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The Best Hysterias: Author’s Response to Ghaemi
Nassir Ghaemi has helped raise the proﬁ  le of this truly 
debilitating disorder [1], but he is wrong on the history of 
bipolar disorder. First, mental disease entities are a recent 
construct. No disease resembling bipolar disorder was 
described before 1854 in Paris, and the links between folie 
circulaire described then and modern bipolar disorder are 
tenuous. Second, for the Greeks, mania referred to any 
overactive insanity, and melancholia to any underactive 
state. The majority of manias were probably delirious states. 
The melancholias may have been anything from Parkinson 
disease to hypothyroidism. Third, Emil Kraepelin’s manic-
depressive insanity (1899) was a very different disorder to 
bipolar disorder, which only arose in the late 1960s. If bipolar 
disorder can be clearly traced back to the Greeks, the fact 
that American physicians so rarely made the diagnosis before 
1970—when lithium was introduced in the United States—is 
hard to explain. Kraepelin’s likely response to recent 
proposals that we recognize and distinguish between bipolar 
1, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 5, and 6 and bipolar spectrum disorders 
would probably not be printable.
Disease mongering is not the creation of diseases de 
novo, as in the restless legs syndrome Dr Ghaemi cites, 
descriptions of which go back to antiquity. As so aptly deﬁ  ned 
by David Menkes at the Conference on Disease Mongering in 
Newcastle in 2006, disease mongering is where the interests 
of the seller of a nostrum, who sells by emphasizing the 
existence of and risks of some condition, in fact outweigh the 
likely beneﬁ  ts from the proposed remedy to those affected 
by the putative condition. It shades into hucksterism and 
it was associated with Harley Street long before modern 
pharmaceutical companies. But companies now bring an 
industrial efﬁ  ciency to this practice, and where physicians 
were once a bulwark of scepticism against any trading on 
credulousness, they are now the most cost-effective marketing 
tool companies have.
Mongering applies to conditions from mild elevations of 
blood pressure or lipids, to bone thinning. No one argues 
hypertension or hypercholesterolaemia are not real or that 
in malignant cases these conditions do not constitute valid 
targets of treatment. But malignant cases are rare. In cases 
that are not malignant, when the likely intervention is with a 
toxic compound rather than a proposed alteration of lifestyle, 
there is or should be a boundary. 
Psychiatry was once plagued by “boundary violations”, 
where physicians exploited the dependence of their patients. 
All the indications are that we are now in a new era of drug-
related boundary violations. There is perhaps nowhere in 
medicine where this is more obvious than in the case of 
bipolar disorders, with adults treated with bizarre cocktails 
and children put on some of the most lethal drugs in 
medicine.
Making it clear that the term “mood stabilizer” is itself 
an advert and that the notion of bipolar disorder can be 
viewed as an instance of rebranding does not deny the 
reality of anything. The key concerns are not reality in this 
sense, but rather when to treat. As the history of hysteria 
shows, the best pseudo-convulsions come from patients with 
convulsive disorders, and the most realistic somatization 
from patients with other real disorders. Patients conform 
their presentations to the interests of their doctors. Drug 
companies know this. Patients deserve physicians alert to such 
possibilities. In the current welter of bipolar presentations, 
one worry is that patients with severe manic-depressive 
disorder will lose out. Another is that research on this most 
difﬁ  cult of disorders will be invalidated by a dilution by 
patients with other problems. A ﬁ  nal worry is that when the 
marketing caravan moves on, manic-depressive illness will be 
left once more under-resourced, and researchers will have 
one less lever to pull as they have “had their chance”.  
David Healy (E-mail: healy_hergest@compuserve.com)
Cardiff University
Bangor, United Kingdom
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Questionable Advertising 
of Psychotropic Medications 
and Disease Mongering
Jeffrey R. Lacasse, Jonathan Leo
David Healy raises intriguing questions regarding the 
rapid increase in bipolar diagnoses and the use of “mood 
stabilizing” medications [1]. Although this phenomenon is 
multifactorial, surely consumer advertising has played a role.
A widely disseminated advertising campaign for aripiprazole 
(Abilify) claimed that it worked in the brain “like a thermostat 
to restore balance” [2]. Interestingly, the Abilify product Web 
sites for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder both used virtually 
identical explanations to describe both neuropathology and the 
drug’s mechanism of action. Print advertisements promoting 
aripiprazole for bipolar disorder claimed: “When activity of key 
brain chemicals is too high, Abilify lowers it....When activity of 
key brain chemicals is too low, Abilify raises it” [3].
Since the product information insert approved by the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) lists the 
mechanism of action as “unknown” [4], this advertisement is 
debatable. It is further questionable whether the complexities 
of treating bipolar disorder (with its unknown etiology and well-
known heterogeneity in response to treatment) are accurately 
portrayed as a reliable, mechanical thermostat. However, 
consumers are likely to ﬁ  nd such advertisements compelling. 
Regarding unipolar depression, we recently argued [5] 
that antidepressant manufacturers commonly advertise 
their products by claiming that depression is caused by 
a lack of serotonin and that selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors normalize this deﬁ  ciency, a claim not congruent 
with the peer-reviewed literature or FDA-approved product 
information. We have not received any academic objections to 
our article, but several prominent psychiatrists have afﬁ  rmed 
our conclusions. For instance, Wayne Goodman, Chair of the 
FDA Psychopharmacological Advisory Committee, admitted 
that the serotonergic theory of depression is a “useful 
metaphor”—and one that he never uses within his own 
psychiatric practice [6].
The presentation of metaphorical explanations as scientiﬁ  c 
consensus in consumer advertising has not been publicly 
addressed by the relevant professional associations. In fact, 
we observe that a cooperative relationship exists between 
industry and medical facilities, even highly esteemed ones: 
the Mayo Clinic Web site on depression, sponsored by 
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals (makers of venlafaxine) explains the 
treatment of depression via the serotonin metaphor [7]. 
Such bioreductionistic and highly arguable advertisements 
for psychiatric treatments imply much about the disorder 
they are licensed for. As Dr. Healy suggests, consumers who 
view such advertisements are likely to characterize their 
problems in a manner congruent with industry promotion 
and to request well-advertised pharmaceuticals as treatment. 
At a bare minimum, increased medicalization will result; in 
some cases, disease mongering may indeed be an appropriate 
characterization.
Such consumer advertising is only possible in the absence 
of vigorous government regulation [8] or outcry from 
professional associations. We hypothesize that their combined 
silence signiﬁ  cantly contributes to the process of disease 
mongering.  
Jeffrey R. Lacasse (E-mail: jeffreylacasse@comcast.net)
Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida, United States of America
Jonathan Leo
Lincoln Memorial University
Harrogate, Tennesseee, United States of America
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Taiwan’s Potential to Assist 
Developing Countries to Combat 
Infectious Diseases
Govindasamy Agoramoorthy, Minna J. Hsu
The article on inﬂ  uenza in tropical regions by Viboud and 
colleagues outlines an alarming global burden of inﬂ  uenza, 
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with an estimated one million annual deaths worldwide [1]. 
We would like to give an example of the immense potential 
of Taiwan to assist developing world communities in ﬁ  ghting 
against emerging infectious diseases in the near future.
Taiwan (area 36,000 km2; population 23 million), ofﬁ  cially 
known as the Republic of China, is located on the Tropic of 
Cancer. Taiwan lost its United Nation membership in 1971 to 
its rival, the People’s Republic of China, but maintains ofﬁ  cial 
diplomatic relations with 25 countries and de facto relations 
with many nations. Taiwan has one of the highest levels 
of life expectancy in Asia, and it has eradicated infectious 
diseases such as the bubonic plague in 1948, smallpox in 
1955, rabies in 1959, malaria in 1965, and polio in 2000. 
Taiwan became the ﬁ  rst country in the world to implement 
a hepatitis B immunization program. Taiwan also initiated 
active vaccination programs against diptheria, pertussis, and 
tetanus in 1955, Japanese encephalitis in 1969, measles in 
1978, hepatitis B in 1984, rubella in 1986, hepatitis A in 1995, 
and inﬂ  uenza in 1998. Valuable lessons may be learned from 
Taiwan’s experience in public health and its response to 
disease outbreaks and crises. 
Taiwan provides a modern, world-class health-care system 
to its people [2]. According to Taiwan Department of 
Health’s statistics, the average life expectancy in 1951 was 
53.38 years, and it increased to 73.35 years for men and 79.05 
years for women in 2003. The Centre for Disease Control in 
Taiwan was established in 1999 to consolidate disease control 
resources. When an epidemic of enterovirus took the lives of 
78 people in 1998, Taiwan responded by setting up disease 
surveillance [3]. 
To ﬁ  ght inﬂ  uenza, Taiwan embarked on a free inﬂ  uenza 
immunization program aiming to increase the coverage rate 
to 80% for those above the age of 65. There has been an 
increase in immunization of the elderly from 59.9% in 2002 
to 68.4% in 2003, with medical care providers and disease 
control staff immunization up to 91.3%. Taiwan is committed 
to retaining vaccination production capability in the event of 
an emergency. The government is supporting a plan for the 
domestic production of inﬂ  uenza vaccines over the next few 
years as a part of Taiwan’s readiness for an avian ﬂ  u epidemic. 
Taiwan is committed to work with the global medical 
community by contributing its resources and expertise. 
Unfortunately, it is not a member of the World Health 
Organization (WHO). It has therefore been excluded from 
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN). 
During the time of the enterovirus outbreak, Taiwan did not 
get any assistance from the WHO but managed to combat 
the outbreak. The avian ﬂ  u scare of 1997 was controlled in 
Hong Kong because of timely action, aided by the WHO. If 
Taiwan is to respond effectively to similar outbreaks of global 
epidemics in the future, it will certainly need the cooperation 
of the WHO. Although the WHO is a non-political agency, 
because of pressure from the People’s Republic of China, 
which considers Taiwan as a renegade province, Taiwan 
has been marginalized. Regardless of this, Taiwan has 
contributed over US$180 million since 1995 in medical 
and humanitarian aid to 95 countries, and it plans to make 
further donations. Therefore, excluding Taiwan from the 
WHO’s GOARN is counterproductive from both medical and 
ethical standpoints.
Taiwan, through its own efforts, has managed to improve 
public health remarkably, despite having no assistance from 
the WHO. It certainly has the potential to assist developing 
nations in the ﬁ  ght against emerging disease outbreaks, so 
other countries can seek Taiwan’s expertise to ﬁ  ght against 
infectious diseases in the near future.  
Govindasamy Agoramoorthy
Tajen University
Pingtung, Taiwan
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National Sun Yat-sen University
Kaohsiung, Taiwan
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